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We compare characteristics of accounting data for firms that adopt International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) to a matched sample of firms that do not to investigate whether reporting under 
IAS is associated with predictable differences in accounting quality and cost of capital.  After 
IAS adoption, firms evidence less earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and more 
value relevance of accounting data than firms that do not adopt.  Also, IAS adopting firms 
evidence higher accounting quality after adoption than before suggesting that IAS adoption is 
associated with an improvement in accounting quality.  While more speculative, our results also 
provide weak evidence that IAS-adopting firms may enjoy lower cost of capital after adoption 
than non-adopting firms, and a reduction in cost of capital following adoption.  Overall, our 
results suggest an improvement in accounting quality associated with IAS adoption. 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
We compare characteristics of accounting amounts for firms that adopt International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) to a matched sample of firms that do not to investigate whether 
reporting under IAS is associated with predictable differences in accounting quality and cost of 
capital.  In particular, we investigate whether applying IAS is associated with less earnings 
management, more timely loss recognition, higher value relevance of accounting amounts, and a 
lower cost of capital.  We first conduct a cross-sectional comparison of IAS and matched non-
IAS firms in the period after IAS firms adopt.  We then conduct a time-series examination of 
whether IAS adopting firms increase accounting quality and decrease their cost of capital after 
adopting IAS.  Our results suggest that IAS firms have higher accounting quality and may have a 
lower cost of capital than non-IAS firms.  Further, we provide evidence of an improvement in 
accounting quality and a reduction in cost of capital around the adoption of IAS, changes that are 
not present to the same extent in our non-adoption sample over the same period.  
Notwithstanding the formidable design hurdles that limit our ability to draw strong conclusions 
from this type of analysis, the findings suggest that using IAS improves financial reporting.  In 
light of the impending changes to IAS promulgated by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB), our findings support the prospect of improvement in financial reporting as more 
countries and firms adopt international accounting standards.1 
The first IAS was published in 1975 by the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC), which was formed in 1973.  Since then, the process for setting international 
accounting standards has undergone substantial evolution, culminating in the 2001 restructuring 
                                                 
1 Given the inherent limitations of this type of research, one must be careful about drawing conclusions for the 
future from past experience.  In particular, the effectiveness of IAS going forward will be a function of the evolution 
of the standards and the implementation of those standards.  However, our results suggest that IAS may have 
improved financial reporting in the past which suggests that it may also do so in the future. 
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of the IASC into the IASB.  As of January 1, 2005, all publicly listed companies in the European 
Union are required to prepare financial statements in accordance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), and the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
recommends that the world’s securities regulators permit foreign issuers to use IFRS for cross-
border offerings.2  In addition, the Financial Accounting Standards Board has embarked on a 
comprehensive project aimed at convergence between IFRS and US Generally Accepted 
Accounting Standards (GAAP). 
Despite the increasing importance of IAS, there is relatively little empirical evidence on 
whether IAS appears to have improved accounting quality for firms that have adopted it, and the 
existing evidence is mixed.  As discussed in the next section, studies on Germany (Hung and 
Subramanyam, 2004 and Bartov, Goldberg, and Kim, 2004) and China (Eccher and Healy, 2003) 
provide mixed evidence on whether international accounting standards have improved reporting, 
based on association of the resulting accounting data with share price.  Other research suggests 
that IAS lead to smaller analyst forecast errors, although forecast errors reflect a wide range of 
influences beyond simply the quality of accounting data (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001).  
Although it might seem inevitable that IAS would improve accounting, Cairns (1999), Street and 
Gray (2001) and Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) suggest that lax enforcement may result in 
limited compliance with the standards, thereby limiting their effectiveness. 
Our study differs from prior research on IAS in at least two ways.  First, our study 
encompasses a broad sample of firms using IAS in 23 countries, and includes adoption years 
covering 1994-2003, thereby resulting in a much longer and broader sample period than those in 
                                                 
2 IFRS are the standards issued by the IASB, and IAS are the standards issued by the IASC, some of which have 
been amended by the IASB after it succeeded the IASC.  Because the IASB adopted all of the standards issued by 
the IASC, IFRS encompasses all standards by the IASC and the IASB.  Our sample period predates the effective 
dates of standards issued by the IASB.  Thus, throughout we refer to use by our sample firms of IAS rather than 
IFRS. 
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prior research.  There are advantages and disadvantages associated with studies focused on 
particular countries and time periods relative to those involving broader sampling criteria.  
Whereas studies focusing on a single country benefit from having research designs that control 
for other country-specific factors, it is difficult to extrapolate inferences relating to their findings 
to other countries.  By considering a broader sample, we hope to be able to draw conclusions that 
are more representative of the effects of IAS.  Also, because we consider a range of countries 
and years, we are more comfortable that results are not limited to a small subset of countries or 
years.  
Second, we directly focus on the characteristics of the resulting accounting amounts 
under IAS.  Whereas several studies provide indirect evidence of the quality of accounting 
amounts (e.g., analyst earning forecast errors or value relevance), results are generally mixed, 
and other confounding aspects of markets and firms’ information environments make it more 
difficult to attribute results to the effect of IAS.  Although we include measures based on value 
relevance, we follow prior research (e.g., Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003) in focusing more 
directly on the characteristics of accounting data to provide evidence on earnings management, 
particularly earnings smoothing, and timely loss recognition.  We focus on earnings management 
metrics because a common concern with applying IAS is that the inherent flexibility IAS affords 
allows firms to manage earnings, which has long been a concern of securities markets regulators 
(e.g., Breeden, 1994).3 
Our metrics of earnings management are the variance of the change in net income, the 
ratio of the variance of the change in net income to the variance of the change in cash flows, the 
                                                 
3 Admittedly, a concern with our analysis is that IAS continue to evolve, so the past is not necessarily representative 
of the future.  However, we believe that providing evidence on the effectiveness of current standards while new 
standards are being developed is potentially more valuable than waiting until the standards are issued.  Further, 
results suggesting that even the early stages of IAS development provided improvements in accounting quality 
provide some comfort that IAS may improve accounting quality going forward. 
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correlation between accruals and cash flows, and the frequency of small positive net income 
(Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; Lang, Raedy and Yetman, 2003; Lang, Raedy and Wilson, 
2005).  We argue that higher quality earnings are those that evidence less earnings management.  
Therefore, following prior research, we interpret higher variance of the change in net income, 
higher ratio of the variances of the change in net income and change in cash flows, less negative 
correlation between accruals and cash flows, and a lower frequency of small positive net income 
as evidence of less earnings management.  Our metric of timely loss recognition is the frequency 
of large negative net income (Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 2003; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2005).  
Consistent with prior research we interpret a higher frequency of large negative net income as 
evidence of higher earnings quality.  Finally, our metrics for value relevance are the explanatory 
power of income and equity book value for prices, and stock return for earnings.  We interpret 
higher explanatory power as evidence of higher accounting quality.4 
Finally, we provide preliminary evidence on the effects of using IAS on firms’ cost of 
equity capital.  Cost of capital reduction is a benefit of using IAS anticipated by standard setters.5  
We estimate equity cost of capital based on the three factor model of Fama and French (1993).  
If firms using IAS have higher quality accounting amounts and there is a link between 
accounting quality and equity cost of capital, then firms using IAS may enjoy a lower cost of 
capital.  We view this analysis as exploratory because it is well known that obtaining accurate 
estimates of cost of capital is difficult. 
                                                 
4 The importance of examining multiple dimensions of accounting quality is illustrated by asset impairments.  The 
presence of large asset impairments likely is positively associated with frequency of large negative net income, but 
could reduce the value relevance of accounting earnings because extreme losses tend to have a low correlation with 
share prices and returns.  See also Wysocki (2005) for a discussion of various approaches to assessing accounting 
quality. 
5 For example, in discussing adoption of IFRS, Bob Herz, chairman of the FASB notes, “It’s about lowering the cost 
of capital, lowering the cost of preparation and lowering the cost of using information” 
(http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,16649-1245761,00.html). 
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We find that after adoption, IAS-adopting firms evidence less earnings management, 
more timely loss recognition, and more value relevance of accounting amounts than firms that do 
not adopt.  In particular, firms adopting IAS have significantly higher variance of the change in 
net income, a higher ratio of the variances of the change in net income and change in cash flows, 
and a lower frequency of small positive net income.  In addition, they have a higher frequency of 
large negative net income and higher value relevance of accounting amounts.  Pre-adoption 
differences between IAS adopting and non-IAS adopting firms do not explain the post-adoption 
differences in earnings quality.  Prior to adopting IAS, firms either insignificantly differ from 
non-adopting firms or have metrics consistent with lower accounting quality.  Consistent with 
these findings relating to accounting quality, we also find weak evidence that IAS adopting firms 
may enjoy a lower cost of capital after adoption than non-adopting firms. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses prior 
research.  This is followed by sections describing our empirical approach, an overview of our 
sample and data, and the study’s primary results.  These are followed by a section on cost of 
capital and a final section presenting conclusions and ongoing analyses. 
II.  PRIOR RESEARCH  
As noted earlier, several studies compare IAS to local-GAAP accounting amounts in 
particular countries.  Hung and Subramanyam (2004) compares the effects of using IAS to those 
of using German GAAP for a sample of eighty German firms that elected to adopt IAS.  The 
study exploits a unique requirement that adopting firms provide both IAS and German GAAP 
amounts in the year of adoption, and documents that the most common sources of reconciling 
items relate to deferred taxes, pensions and property, plant and equipment.  Further, the 
adjustments to net income generally are not value relevant.  Although the results are interesting, 
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they may not generalize to other environments for several reasons.  First, the sample is relatively 
small and fairly unique.  Further, as Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003) observe, firms preparing to 
adopt new accounting standards likely transition gradually, changing accounting in their local 
GAAP financial statements to avoid reconciling items.  Consistent with that, Hung and 
Subramanyam (2004) finds relatively few reconciling items related to earnings management, 
such as hidden reserves, which is striking because the existence of such earnings management 
items is a common concern with German GAAP. 
Second, the conclusions in Hung and Subramanyam (2004) are inconsistent with those in 
Bartov, Goldberg, and Kim (2004), which also compares the effects of IAS and German GAAP.  
In particular, Bartov, Goldberg, and Kim (2004) examines the value relevance of earnings by 
focusing on the magnitude of its coefficients in regressions of returns on earnings based on US 
GAAP, IAS, and German GAAP.  In contrast to Hung and Subramanyam (2004), Bartov, 
Goldberg, and Kim (2004) conduct their analysis in cross-section and provide evidence that 
accounting earnings based on IAS are more value relevant than those based on German GAAP 
(although less value relevant than those under US GAAP).  Again, the difference in results may 
reflect the fact that, at the time of IAS adoption, differences between IAS and local GAAP are 
less pronounced than in the typical year. 
Eccher and Healy (2003) compares the value relevance of accounting amounts based on 
IAS to those based on Chinese GAAP for a sample of firms in the People’s Republic of China.  
The study finds that accounting amounts based on IAS are not more value relevant than those 
based on Chinese GAAP for firms that can be owned by foreign investors.  Further, accounting 
amounts based on IAS are less value relevant than those based on Chinese GAAP for firms that 
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are limited to domestic investors.  The authors posit that one reason for the modest performance 
of IAS may be the lack of effective controls and infrastructure to monitor reporting under IAS. 
Using an alternative approach, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) investigates whether 
deviations of local standards relative to IAS cause earnings to be more difficult to forecast, and 
whether forecasts errors are smaller following adoption of IAS.  The study finds that the greater 
the difference between domestic GAAP and IAS, the greater are the forecast errors and that 
forecast errors tend to be smaller after firms adopt IAS.  Although earnings forecastability may 
be correlated with accounting quality, it confounds accounting quality with the effects of factors 
present in the firm’s information environment, including analyst private information acquisition 
and the transparency of other disclosures.  Because adoption of IAS and development of 
domestic GAAP similar to IAS likely occur together, financial statements for firms that adopt 
IAS or in countries that develop domestic GAAP that is similar to IAS are likely to be more 
transparent in general.  In addition, the enforcement and attestation environment in countries 
with accounting standards closer to IAS also are more likely to have better implementation of 
those standards.  Further, it is not clear that forecastable earnings are of higher quality because, 
for example, smoothed earnings will typically be more forecastable, but are not necessarily of 
higher quality. 
The findings from these papers offer mixed evidence concerning whether IAS adoption 
improves accounting quality.  One potential reason for this suggested by the findings in Cairns 
(1999) and Street and Gray (2001) is substantial noncompliance with IAS among firms 
purportedly using IAS.  In particular, Street and Gray (2001) examines the 1998 financial 
statements for 279 firms that refer to use of IAS in their financial statements.  The study 
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examines disclosed accounting policies for consistency with major IAS pronouncements and 
finds that, in many cases, disclosed accounting policies are inconsistent with IAS.   
Although not directly focused on IAS, Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) reaches similar 
conclusions based on attributes of accounting amounts for firms in Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand, where accounting standards are largely derived from common law 
sources and therefore are similar to IAS.  The study finds that accounting amounts of firms in 
these countries are of no higher quality (as measured by timely recognition of economic income) 
than are those of firms in code law countries.  The authors attribute this finding to differing 
incentives of managers and auditors across these reporting regimes, thereby highlighting the 
importance of considering factors beyond accounting standards when comparing the quality of 
accounting amounts associated with domestic GAAP and IAS. 
Several papers also provide comparisons of IAS to US GAAP.  For example, Leuz (2003) 
compares measures of information asymmetry and market liquidity for firms trading in 
Germany’s New Market, which must choose between IAS and US GAAP in preparing their 
financial statements.  The study finds that there is little evidence of differences in measures of 
information asymmetry for German firms that adopt US GAAP relative to those that adopt IAS.  
However, Harris and Muller (1999) documents that, for a small sample of IAS firms cross-listing 
on US markets, accounting amounts reconciled to US GAAP are more value relevant than the 
original IAS amounts.6  As with the evidence comparing IAS to domestic GAAP, existing 
research provides mixed evidence on the superiority of IAS relative to US GAAP.  Overall, 
therefore, we view the extent to which IAS improve accounting quality as an open question.  
                                                 
6 One study that indirectly compares IAS and US GAAP, Ashbaugh and Olsson (2002), compares valuation models 
apparently used in valuing non-US firms that are cross-listed on the International Stock Exchange in London, and 
finds that firms using IAS appear to be valued based on an earnings capitalization model, whereas those using US 
GAAP appear to be valued based on a residual income model. 
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III.  EMPIRICAL DESIGN  
We base our inferences on a consistent pattern of evidence provided by a series of 
measures of accounting quality identified in prior research.  We group our measures into three 
categories: earnings management, timely loss recognition, and value relevance.  Similar to those 
studies examining differences between cross-listed and other firms (Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 
2003; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2005), it is possible that firms’ decisions to use IAS are 
associated with underlying firm characteristics that could also be associated with our accounting 
quality measures.  As a result, we utilize a matched sample based on home country, industry, and 
size.  Consistent with Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003) and Lang Raedy, and Wilson (2005) but 
modified to our context, we first match each ADOPT firm exactly on country and industry 
(three-digit SIC code).  We then select the NADOPT firm from potential non-adopting firms as 
that firm whose equity market value is closest to the ADOPT firm’s at the end of the year of 
adoption.  Once a non-adopting firm is selected as a match, it is not considered as a potential 
match for other ADOPT firms.  In a few cases, potential matching firms do not have market 
value of equity available in the adoption year.  In those cases, we consider market value of equity 
for the two years before and after the adoption year.7 
 We first compare ADOPT and NADOPT firms in the post-adoption period to see if 
accounting amounts determined using international accounting standards evidence higher 
quality.  It is possible that despite our matching procedure, ADOPT and NADOPT firms exhibit 
differences in quality in the post-adoption period because they differ before adoption.  Thus, we 
also compare their accounting quality in the pre-adoption period.  Finally, to assess whether 
adoption of international accounting standards changes accounting quality for the typical 
                                                 
7 We also considered a variety of other matching procedures (e.g., permitting the same matching firms to be used 
multiple times and considering only matching firms with market value of equity in the adoption year).  Inferences 
are similar using these alternative procedures. 
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ADOPT firm, we compare accounting quality for our ADOPT firms in the pre-adoption period to 
the post-adoption period. 
Earnings Management 
We employ several measures of earnings management.  To the extent that results are 
consistent across the measures, there is greater assurance that findings can be attributed to 
earnings management rather than other factors.  Our measures are designed to detect earnings 
smoothing and managing earnings towards a target of positive earnings. 
Our measures of earnings smoothing focus on variability of earnings (Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki, 2003; Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 2003; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2005).  Earnings 
that are smoothed should be less variable than those that are not.  We predict that ADOPT firms 
have less smooth earnings than NADOPT firms.  The basis of this prediction is that international 
accounting standards are based on a conceptual framework similar to that found in common law 
countries, and Leuz et al. (2002) finds that earnings smoothing is more pronounced non-common 
law countries.  The three earnings smoothing measures we use are similar to those in Leuz et al. 
(2003). 
 The first earnings smoothing measure is the variability of the change in net income scaled 
by total assets, NI∆ .  A smaller variance is evidence consistent with earnings smoothing.  Our 
second measure of earnings smoothing is the ratio of the variability of the change in net income, 
NI∆ , to the variability of the change in operating cash flows, CF∆ .  Firms with more volatile 
cash flows typically have more volatile net income, and our second measure controls for this.  If 
firms use accruals to manage earnings, the variability of the change in net income should be 
 11
lower than that of operating cash flows.8  We winsorize these two measures at the 5% level 
because variance measures are sensitive to outliers.   
Our third measure of earnings smoothing is the Spearman correlation between accruals, 
ACC, and cash flows, CF.  Because accounting accruals reverse over time, we expect that 
accruals and cash flows are negatively correlated.  Myers and Skinner (2002) and Land and Lang 
(2002), among others, argue that a more negative correlation is suggestive of earnings smoothing 
because managers appear to respond to poor cash flow outcomes by increasing accruals.   
Another approach to examining earnings management is to focus on targets toward which 
firms might manage earnings.  A common target is small positive earnings (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997 and Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003).  The notion underlying this measure is that 
management prefers to report small positive earnings rather than negative earnings.  Our measure 












where )1,0(ADOPT  is an indicator variable set to one for ADOPT firms and zero for NADOPT 
firms, SPOS  is an indicator variable that equals one if net income scaled by total assets is 
between 0 and 0.01 (Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 2003), SIZE  is the natural log of end of year 
market value of equity, LEV  is end of year total liabilities divided by end of year total equity 
book value, GROWTH  is percentage change in sales, EISSUE  is percentage change in common 
                                                 
8 Datastream provides several definitions of operating income.  The one we use does not include extraordinary items 
and other non-operating income.  However, because of the concern that the criterion for extraordinary items differs 
across countries and that excluding extraordinary items would result in differences based on the location on the 
income statement of one-time items, we replicate the analysis including extraordinary and non-operating items.  
Results are similar. 
9 In both the analysis of small positive net income and large negative net income, we report results from OLS 
estimation rather than from a logit estimation because the model rejects the test for homoskedasticity at the 1% 
level.  Greene (1993) reports that logit models are extremely sensitive to the effects of heteroskedasticity.   
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stock, DISSUE  is percentage change in total liabilities, CF  is annual net cash flow from 
operating activities, and TURN  is sales divided by end of year total assets.  A negative 
coefficient on SPOS  suggests that NADOPT firms manage earnings toward small positive 
amounts more frequently than do ADOPT firms.  Equation (1) includes variables to control for 
differences in economic factors associated with firms adopting IAS that might not be captured by 
the matched sample design.10 
Timely Loss Recognition 
The next dimension of accounting quality we consider is timely loss recognition.  Ball, 
Kothari, and Robin (2000), Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003), and Lang, Raedy, and Wilson 
(2005) suggest that one characteristic of higher quality earnings is that large losses are 
recognized as they occur rather than being deferred to future periods.  This characteristic is 
closely related to earnings smoothing in that if earnings are smoothed, large losses should be 
relatively rare.  Following Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003), and Lang, Raedy, and Wilson 
(2005), we measure timely loss recognition as the coefficient on the percentage of large negative 












where all variables are defined as in equation (1) except for LNEG, which is an indicator variable 
set to one for observations for which annual net income scaled by total assets is less than −0.20, 
and zero otherwise.  A positive coefficient on LNEG suggests that ADOPT firms recognize large 
losses more readily than NADOPT firms.  As with equation (1), equation (2) includes variables 
                                                 
10 The control variables are based on those found in Pagano et al. (2002), which models firms’ decisions to cross list 
their securities, and Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003) and Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2005) which examine 
accounting quality in an international context.  Another approach would be to use SPOS as the dependent variable 
and ADOPT as an independent variable.  Results are similar for that specification.   
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to control for differences in economic factors associated with firms adopting IAS that might not 
be captured by the matched sample design.    
Value Relevance 
The final measures of accounting quality we consider relate to value relevance.  The 
presumption is that higher quality accounting amounts have a higher association with share 
prices and returns (Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 2001; Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 2003; Lang, 
Raedy, and Wilson, 2005).  Because we expect ADOPT firms to have higher quality accounting 
amounts, we predict that ADOPT firms will have higher value relevance measures.  The first 
value relevance measure is the R2 from a regression of stock price on earnings and equity book 
value.  Following Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003) and Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2005), we 
regress price, PRICE, as of six months after year-end on book value per share, BVEPS, and net 
income per share, NIPS, separately for ADOPT and NADOPT firms: 11 
itititit NIPSBVEPSPRICE εβββ +++= 210     (3) 
The second value relevance measure is based on the R2 from a regression of earnings on 
stock returns, which we estimate separately for ADOPT and NADOPT firms:  
ititit RETURNPNI εββ ++= 10/      (4) 
where PNI /  is net income divided by beginning of year stock price, and RETURN  is the 
twelve-month stock return, commencing nine months before fiscal year end and ending three 
months after fiscal year end (Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2005).  Higher quality earnings should 
result in a higher association with stock returns to the extent that firms that manage earnings 
have a lower association between earnings and stock returns.  We estimate equation (4) as a 
                                                 
11 Brown, Lo, and Lys (1999) discusses scale issues related to inferences from price level regressions when samples 
differ in terms of general share price levels.  The study recommends deflating the regression variables by past price 
to mitigate the effect of scale.  As a consequence, consistent with Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2005), we deflate all 
variables by price as of six months after the preceding year end. 
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“reverse” regression with accounting earnings as the dependent variable rather than stock return 
because this permits us to partition firms based on the sign of the return when considering 
whether the association differs for good news, i.e., positive stock return, and bad news, i.e., 
negative stock return.  Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) predicts that accounting quality 
differences will be most pronounced for bad news because when firms have good news they 
have less incentive to manage earnings.  To examine whether this is the case, we also estimate 
equation (4) separately for positive and negative return subsamples of ADOPT and NADOPT 
firms.   
IV.  DATA 
Our sample comprises 2,295 firm year observations for 411 firms adopting IAS for which 
Datastream data are available over the period 1990 through 2004.  We obtain our sample of IAS 
adopters from Worldscope, and gather financial and accounting data from Datastream. 
Table 1, panel A, includes descriptive statistics for our sample firms in terms of country 
representation.  In general, the sample firm-years are from a wide range of countries, with 
greatest representation from Switzerland, Germany, and China.  Panel B of table 1 reports 
representation by industry.  The sample also comprises a range of industries, with most firms in 
manufacturing, financing or services.  However, given our matching criteria, industry effects 
should be naturally controlled.  Panel C of table 1 reports representation by number of 
observations and adoption year.  The sample observations are from a wide range of years, as are 
the IAS adoptions. 
Table 2, panel A, reports descriptive statistics for the ADOPT and NADOPT firms.  In 
terms of the variables of interest, the ADOPT firms have significantly fewer incidents of small 
positive earnings and more incidents of large negative earnings.  Although these results do not 
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control for other factors, they suggest that ADOPT firms are less likely to manage earnings 
towards a target and more likely to recognize losses in a timely manner than NADOPT firms.  In 
terms of control variables, the ADOPT firms are higher growth than the NADOPT firms (median 
7% vs. 6%).  Despite the size match, the ADOPT firms are somewhat larger than the NADOPT 
firms, although there is a good deal of overlap between the two distributions.  Further, there is 
some evidence that the ADOPT firms are more likely to issue debt (mean but not median 
difference is significant), more likely to issue equity (median but not mean difference is 
significant) and are less highly levered (mean but not median difference is significant).12  We 
control for these factors where possible in our empirical analysis. 
V. RESULTS 
Post-Adoption Period 
Table 3 presents our primary results for earnings management, timely loss recognition 
and stock price associations for ADOPT and NADOPT firms in the post-adoption period.   
Earnings Management 
The first finding relating to earnings management indicates that ADOPT firms exhibit 
significantly higher variability in the change in net income, NI∆  (using a variance ratio F-test), 
0.0040 versus 0.0033.  This finding is consistent with ADOPT firms reporting less smooth 
earnings than NADOPT firms in the post-adoption period.  Of course, the variance of net income 
could be driven by the variability of cash flows.  However, the second finding indicates that the 
ratio of the variance of change in net income, NI∆ , to the variance in the change in cash flow, 
CF∆ , is also consistent with ADOPT firms exhibiting less smooth income.  In particular, the 
ratios are 0.729 and 0.696 for ADOPT and NADOPT firms, suggesting that the difference in net 
                                                 
12 With the exception of the descriptive statistics in table 2 for which statistical significance is assessed using a two-
sided alternative, throughout we use a 5% significance level to assess statistical significance based on a one-sided 
alternative. 
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income variability is not solely a result of a difference in cash flow variability.  As in Lang, 
Raedy, and Wilson (2005), we do not test the differences between ADOPT and NADOPT firms 
because we are unaware of any statistical test for differences in the ratios of variances.   
Consistent with the first two measures, the third finding indicates that the correlation 
between accruals, ACC, and cash flow, CF, is –0.517 for the ADOPT firms and -0.560 for the 
NADOPT firms, which suggests more smoothing for the non-adopters, although the difference is 
not significantly different.   
Finally, the coefficient on SPOS from equation (1) is significantly negative, which 
indicates that NADOPT firms more frequently report small positive earnings, consistent with 
managing earnings towards an earnings target.  This finding complements the earnings 
smoothing findings by indicating that not only do ADOPT firms evidence less earnings 
smoothing than NADOPT firms, but also they appear less likely to manage earnings toward a 
target.  
Timely Loss Recognition 
 The next finding in table 3 relates to timely loss recognition.  The significantly positive 
coefficient on LNEG in equation (2) suggests that, controlling for other factors, ADOPT firms 
recognize large losses more readily than NADOPT firms.  This finding suggests that relative to 
ADOPT firms, NADOPT firms smooth earnings by delaying the effects of large negative 
outcomes.  In particular, one interpretation of the results relating to SPOS and LNEG is that 
managers of NADOPT firms smooth away from large negative earnings and toward small 




Value Relevance  
Our final set of findings in table 3 relates to value relevance of accounting information.  
First, regressions of price on earnings and equity book value for ADOPT and NADOPT firms 
reveal that the R2 for ADOPT firms is significantly greater than that for NADOPT firms, 13.6% 
vs. 10.3%.  Untabulated regression summary statistics indicate that, as expected, the coefficients 
on earnings and equity book value are significantly positive for both ADOPT and NADOPT 
firms, and that both coefficients are smaller for NADOPT firms.  The findings are consistent 
with accounting data being more value relevant for ADOPT than for NADOPT firms. 
R2s from a regression of earnings on returns are 10.5% for ADOPT firms and 8.3% 
NADOPT firms, a significant difference which is consistent with higher earnings quality for 
ADOPT firms.  R2s for ADOPT firms are higher for both good news (3.1% versus 0%) and for 
bad news (9.7% versus 9.4%), although the differences are only statistically significant for the 
good news firms.  Taken together, there is evidence of greater value relevance for ADOPT firms 
based on both the price and returns regressions.   
Pre-Adoption Period 
One potential concern in interpreting the preceding results is that we may be capturing 
the effect of self-selection.  In particular, if firms with high quality accounting are more likely to 
adopt IAS, IAS may serve a sorting role but not improve the quality of firms’ accounting.  To 
examine this possibility, we replicate our analysis for the period prior to IAS adoption.  Table 4 
presents findings for earnings management, timely loss recognition, and value relevance for 





The first finding relating to earnings management indicates that ADOPT firms exhibit a 
lower variance in the change in net income, NI∆ , than NADOPT firms in the pre-adoption 
period, 0.0025 versus 0.0031.  This finding contrasts with that from the post-adoption period in 
which ADOPT firms have significantly higher variance in NI∆ .  This indicates that the higher 
NI∆  variance for ADOPT firms in table 3 in the post-adoption period is not a result of higher 
NI∆  variance for ADOPT firms in the pre-adoption period.  The second finding indicates that 
the ratio of the variance of change in net income, NI∆ , to the variance in the change in cash 
flow, CF∆ , is substantially higher for NADOPT firms than for ADOPT firms, 0.62 vs. 0.50.  
This suggests that ADOPT firms evidence more earnings smoothing than NADOPT firms in the 
pre-adoption period.  This is in contrast with the finding for the post-adoption period, in which 
NADOPT firms have a somewhat lower ratio in the two variances, indicating that ADOPT firms 
evidence less earnings smoothing in the post-adoption period.  This again indicates that the 
higher ratio of the variances in NI∆  to CF∆  in table 3 in the post-adoption period is not a result 
of a higher ratio for ADOPT firms in the pre-adoption period 
The third finding indicates that the correlations between accruals, ACC, and cash flow, 
CF, are lower for ADOPT firms, –0.54 and –0.57, suggesting that the ADOPT firms smooth 
earnings more than the NADOPT firms in the pre-adoption period, although the difference is not 
significant. 
Finally, the coefficient on SPOS from equation (1) is insignificantly different from zero 
in the pre-adoption period, which indicates that NADOPT and ADOPT firms report small 
positive earnings with similar frequencies in the pre-adoption period.  Similar to our other 
measures of earnings management, this finding indicates that the significant SPOS finding in 
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table 3 is not solely attributable to pre-adoption differences in small positive earnings 
frequencies.  
Timely Loss Recognition 
 The next finding in table 4 relating to timely loss recognition indicates that the LNEG 
coefficient is insignificantly higher for ADOPT than NADOPT firms, providing weak evidence 
that ADOPT firms recognize losses more readily even in the pre-adoption period.  However, the 
relation strengthens after adoption. 
Value Relevance  
Our final set of findings in table 4 relates to value relevance of accounting information.  
In contrast to the results for earnings smoothing and timely loss recognition, regressions of price 
on earnings and equity book value for ADOPT and NADOPT firms reveal that the R2 for 
ADOPT firms is significantly greater than that for NADOPT firms, 28% versus 23%.  Thus, the 
higher value relevance in the post-adoption period evidenced by price regressions for ADOPT 
firms could be attributable to their having higher value relevance before adoption of international 
accounting standards.  However, the R2s from a regression of earnings on returns for ADOPT 
and NADOPT firms in the pre-adoption period are 7.7% and 8.0%, respectively, suggesting that 
differences in value relevance as measured by the earnings-returns regression did not exist prior 
to IAS adoption.    
Comparison of Post- and Pre-Adoption Periods 
Overall, results for the pre-adoption period provide little evidence that the results in the 
post-adoption period were also in evidence prior to IAS adoption.  To investigate more directly 
the issue of whether our post-adoption results reflect pre-existing differences or the effect of 
changes associated with IAS adoption, we conduct an analysis of changes in our measures 
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around the adoption year for ADOPT and NONADOPT firms.  While this analysis has the 
advantage of effectively using the firm as its own control, there are important caveats.  First, 
because there are different numbers of pre- and post-adoption years for firms in our sample, the 
pre- and post-adoption panels are unbalanced in terms of number of observations.  Second, if 
firms transition gradually to IAS, some of the observations around the adoption date will be 
confounded, potentially weakening our results.  Third, it is possible that some of the effects of 
IAS are also manifested in the non-IAS firms because, for example, of local GAAP changing to 
be more similar to IAS, potentially understating the effects of IAS for the ADOPT firms relative 
to the NADOPT firms.  
Table 5 presents a comparison of findings for earnings management, timely loss 
recognition, and value relevance for ADOPT firms in the pre- and post-adoption period, as well 
as significance tests.  Tests for all measures except price level regressions suggest improvements 
in accounting quality.  In particular, variability of net income and variability of net income 
relative to cash flows increase around IAS adoption.  The correlation between accruals and cash 
flows also becomes less negative after adoption, although the change is not statistically 
significant.  Similarly, the proportion of small positive net income decreases significantly after 
adoption, suggesting less of a tendency to manage toward a target.13  In terms of timely loss 
recognition, the proportion of large negative earnings is significantly higher post-adoption than 
pre-adoption.  The R2 from the returns regression also increases (although not significantly), 
which is driven primarily by an increase in the R2 for bad news.  Only the price level regressions 
do not improve between the pre- and post- periods.  However, the drop in R2 is mirrored by the 
                                                 
13 For the tests of small positive and large negative earnings, we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) with the dependent 
variable changed from an adoption indicator to a post-adoption indicator, so that the tests examine whether there is a 
higher proportion of small positive and large negative earnings post-adoption relative to pre-adoption.    
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drop in R2 for the control firms.  As a consequence, it appears that the drop in price regression 
explanatory power may be driven by factors that are not unique to the adoption firms. 
More generally, a relevant question is to what extent the changes we observe for the 
ADOPT firms are mirrored for the NADOPT sample.  For example, Land and Lang (2002) 
suggests that accounting quality may be improving worldwide.  From the preceding analysis we 
know that the post-adoption differences between the ADOPT and NADOPT firms are generally 
not reflected in pre-adoption differences, indicating that the changes we observe around adoption 
for the ADOPT firms do not occur to the same extent for NADOPT firms.  Moreover, results in 
table 3 and 4 suggest that the change in our measures for the ADOPT firms are larger than for 
the NADOPT firms, except for the price level regression R2s which decrease by similar amounts 
for both samples of firms.  Taken together, our results suggest that improvements in accounting 
quality occur around the adoption of IAS, providing additional support for our cross-sectional 
results. 
VI.  EFFECTS OF IAS ADOPTION ON EQUITY COST OF CAPITAL 
 Next we consider whether adoption of IAS is associated with a reduction in equity cost of 
capital as a result of providing investors with accounting information of higher quality.  Findings 
from the information economics literature provide theoretical links between accounting 
information and the cost of capital arising from information asymmetry.  An important study is 
Easley and O’Hara (2004) which develops an asset pricing model in which both public and 
private information affect asset returns, thereby linking a firm’s information structure to its cost 
of capital.  A key result of their model is that firms can influence their cost of capital by affecting 
the precision and quantity of information available to investors.  In particular, the authors note 
“this can be accomplished by a firm’s selection of its accounting standards, as well as through its 
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corporate disclosure policies.”  Related research includes Amihud and Mendelson (1986) which 
develops an asset pricing model in which investors require a liquidity premium to compensate 
them for the costs of trading in a firm’s securities.  In addition, several studies, relying on 
somewhat different assumptions, link information and cost of capital by suggesting that 
increased information provided by financial disclosure can reduce estimation risk, thereby 
lowering the cost of capital (Klein and Bawa, 1977; Barry and Brown, 1985; Coles and 
Loewenstein, 1988; Clarkson and Thompson, 1990; and Handa and Linn, 1993). 
 Several studies provide empirical evidence linking accounting quality and equity cost of 
capital.  Botosan (1997) and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) provide evidence that proxies for 
expected cost of equity capital are negatively related to the voluntary disclosure level as 
measured by AIMR corporate disclosure scores.  Francis, et al. (2004) relates measures of 
earnings quality to proxies for equity cost of capital.  Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) 
finds a link between three earnings quality measures (earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, 
and earnings smoothing) and a proxy for cost of equity capital in country-level tests.  Barth, 
Konchitchki, and Landsman (2005) provided evidence that a measure of accounting quality loads 
incrementally to the Fama-French factors in a returns prediction model, and is correlated with 
equity cost of capital constructed from a three-factor Fama-French approach similar to the one 
used here.  
 Collectively, the theoretical and empirical research linking accounting quality and equity 
cost of capital leads us to predict that IAS adoption will be associated with a reduction of equity 
cost of capital.  We test this by comparing our estimate of the equity cost of capital for ADOPT 
firms in the pre- and post-adoption periods, using the matched sample of NADOPT firms to 
 23
control for intertemporal changes in equity cost of capital unrelated to IAS adoption.  We next 
describe how we estimate equity cost of capital.  
Estimation of Equity Cost of Capital 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) infer cost of capital from share price and earnings forecasts.  
Because we do not have earnings forecasts for many of our sample firms, we instead follow the 
approach in Griffin (2002), Ang and Liu (2004) and Massa, Peyer, and Tong (2004), in 
estimating expected equity cost of capital using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, 
which expresses the firm’s equity return in excess of the risk-free rate of return, fi RR − , as a 
linear function of the excess return of the market portfolio, fm RR − , the return on the high minus 
low book-to-market ( HML ) factor mimicking portfolio, and the return on the small-minus-big 
( SMB ) factor mimicking portfolio.  The procedure has two main steps.  First, for each firm, i, we 
estimate the sensitivity of the firm’s return to each of the three Fama-French factors by 
estimating the following monthly time-series regression: 
mimiSMBmiHMLmfmMiRMRFimfmi SMBHMLRRRRET ,,,,,,,, )()()( εβββα +++−+=−  (5) 
where iRMRF ,β , iHML,β , and iSMB,β  are the respective factor coefficients estimated using the most 
recent 60 months returns, if available, prior to the beginning of firm i’s fiscal year t.  For fiscal 
year t, monthly betas are set equal to the same fitted coefficient estimates, 
tiSMBtiHMLtiRMRF ,,,,,,
ˆ,ˆ,ˆ βββ .  Betas are updated annually using a rolling 60-month window.14 
Second, we estimate the expected annual factor returns by first calculating each factor’s 
average monthly return over the 60 months prior to month m, and then compounding the 
resulting average monthly returns over the twelve months prior to the beginning of firm i’s fiscal 
                                                 
14 Data availability limits the number of firms for which there are 60 months of data.  We require a minimum of 24 
monthly returns to estimate equation (5). 
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year.15  We obtain our estimate of the annual expected equity cost of capital, ECC, for firm i and 
year t (based on data available at the beginning of year t) by multiplying the expected factor 
returns by their respective estimated factor loadings: 
ttiSMBttiHMLtfMtiRMRFtft SMBHMLRRRECC ][ˆ][ˆ][ˆ ,,,,,,, ∗+∗+−∗+= βββ  (6) 
where tfM RR ][ − , tHML][ , and tSMB][  are the expected annual factor returns for year t + 1. 
Equity Cost of Capital Results 
 Table 6 presents equity cost of capital results.16  Panels A and B tabulate ECC summary 
statistics for ADOPT and NADOPT firms in the pre- and post-adoption periods.  Whereas panel 
A indicates that both ADOPT and NADOPT firms have essentially the same (and statistically 
indistinguishable) ECC means in the pre-adoption period, 11.48% and 11.42%, mean ECC for 
ADOPT firms is 0.77% lower than that for NADOPT firms in the post-adoption period, 5.67% 
vs. 6.44%, although the difference is not statistically significant because of the large standard 
errors of the estimates.  Panels C and D, which tabulate ECC statistics separately for ADOPT 
and NADOPT firms, indicate that mean ECC is significantly smaller for both sets of firms in the 
post-adoption period than in the pre-adoption period.  It appears that the drop in our estimate of 
the cost of capital between the pre- and post-adoptions periods may be attributable, at least in 
part, to the effects of IAS adoption because the fall in cost of capital is greater in magnitude 
(albeit insignificant) for adopting firms.   
                                                 
15 Note that because five-year rolling windows may result in an outdated estimated risk-free rate, we calculate the 
expected monthly risk-free rate based on a one-year rolling risk-free rate, updated monthly.  The expected annual 
risk-free rate, tfR , , is obtained by compounding the expected monthly risk-free rate. 
16 The smaller sample sizes in table 6 relative to earlier tables because of the loss of sample years when estimating 
the parameters used to estimate ECC in equation (5).  In addition, to deal with extreme outliers, we effectively 
winsorize all ECC estimates by setting ECC to an average of the fitted value from equation (6) and the sample 
average ECC for each year.  Untabulated results based on the non-winsorized ECCs result in similar inferences to 
those drawn from the findings in table 6. 
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VII.  CONCLUSIONS AND ONGOING ANALYSES 
Overall, our results suggest that IAS improve accounting quality and reduce the cost of 
capital.  In particular, firms that adopt IAS show less evidence of earnings smoothing, less 
evidence of managing earnings towards a target, more timely recognition of losses, and a higher 
association with returns.  Results are generally consistent in cross-section as well as comparing 
firms before and after adopting IAS, suggesting that the change occurs in conjunction with IAS 
adoption.  Although somewhat more speculative, the cost of capital results provide weak 
evidence that the improvements in quality may also reduce firms’ cost of capital. 
Taken as a whole, our results are encouraging in suggesting that IAS adoption appears to 
improve financial reporting.  This conclusion is particularly heartening in that the period we 
consider is one in which IAS was undergoing substantial change and enforcement was 
potentially spotty.  Assuming increased specificity and enforcement of IAS, our results suggest 
that IAS could continue to improve financial reporting going forward. 
Of course, our results are only suggestive and are subject to numerous caveats.  For 
example, we cannot be sure that our results reflect the effect of IAS and not some omitted 
correlated variable.  However, the facts that results are robust to matching and controls and 
obtain for the pre-/post-adoption analysis reduce the likelihood of significant omitted correlated 
variables.  Further, it is not clear what the role of IAS is in improving accounting quality.  For 
example, it is possible that firms claiming IAS compliance may attract additional audit or 
regulatory scrutiny.  However, that possibility should be mitigated by the fact that our 
comparisons are within-country, which should, at least partially, control for regulatory 
environment. 
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In ongoing work, we are conducting additional refinements of our analyses.  First, we are 
comparing the effects of IAS across different countries and time periods.  Although it seems 
clear that the effect of IAS likely differs across time periods and countries, it is difficult to 
predict ex ante where IAS should make the biggest difference.  On the one hand, countries such 
as Germany have a stakeholder focus whereas IAS has a shareholder focus, suggesting that the 
underlying standards may be quite different.  On the other hand, Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) 
points to the importance of enforcement in the application of IAS.  Because enforcement differs 
across countries, the application of IAS may as well.  Further, although IAS has become better 
defined in recent years, accounting standards have likely improved worldwide over time (Land 
and Lang, 2002), so the improvement under IAS may be less pronounced, even if IAS standards 
are higher quality on average.  As a consequence, we view evidence from such analyses as 
descriptive rather than as a test of a specific hypothesis. 
Preliminary analyses splitting the sample between code and common law countries 
suggest that results are strongest for code law countries.  In part, that is not particularly 
surprising because the majority of our sample observations pertain to code law countries and 
differences between local GAAP and IAS are likely to be greatest there.  Preliminary analyses by 
time period suggest that results are strongest after 1998, the year when the core standards were 
completed and IAS adopters were first required to comply completely with IAS.  We continue to 
refine these analyses. 
Similarly, we are presently investigating whether cross-listing is an important 
determinant of IAS adoption and influential in affecting our reported findings.  Most previous 
cross-listing studies focus on US cross-listing because of the additional regulatory oversight 
associated with US listing.  It seems unlikely that firms adopt IAS to cross-list onto US markets 
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because IAS users must reconcile to US GAAP.  Further, our controls for equity issuance should, 
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Percentage of Unique 
Adoption Firms
AUSTRALIA 2 0.09 1 0.24
AUSTRIA 191 8.32 30 7.30
BELGIUM 23 1.00 5 1.22
CANADA 5 0.22 1 0.24
CHINA 431 18.78 91 22.14
CZECH REPUBLIC 42 1.83 7 1.70
DENMARK 44 1.92 6 1.46
FINLAND 46 2.00 4 0.97
GERMANY 475 20.70 100 24.33
GREECE 12 0.52 2 0.49
HONG KONG 56 2.44 12 2.92
HUNGARY 66 2.88 11 2.68
MEXICO 2 0.09 1 0.24
NORWAY 2 0.09 1 0.24
POLAND 18 0.78 5 1.22
PORTUGAL 9 0.39 2 0.49
RUSSIAN FEDER 2 0.09 2 0.49
SINGAPORE 27 1.18 8 1.95
SOUTH AFRICA 79 3.44 9 2.19
SPAIN 3 0.13 1 0.24
SWEDEN 5 0.22 2 0.49
SWITZERLAND 661 28.80 91 22.14
TURKEY 84 3.66 16 3.89
UNITED KINGDOM 10 0.44 3 0.73
Totals 2295 100.00 411 100.00
Table 1: Frequencies of IAS Adopters 





Percentage of  
Firm-Year 
Observations





Agriculture, Forestry and  Fishing 3 0.13 1 0.24
Mining 148 6.45 25 6.08
Construction 173 7.54 23 5.60
Manufacturing 1141 49.72 188 45.74
Utilities 147 6.41 24 5.84
Retail Trade 56 2.44 9 2.19
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 349 15.21 60 14.60
Services 252 10.98 74 18.00
Public Administration 26 1.13 7 1.70
Totals 2295 100.00 411 100.00
Table 1: Frequencies of IAS Adopters 














1994 311 13.55 27 6.57
1995 127 5.53 16 3.89
1996 130 5.66 20 4.87
1997 193 8.41 30 7.30
1998 256 11.15 35 8.52
1999 305 13.29 64 15.57
2000 440 19.17 96 23.36
2001 187 8.15 41 9.98
2002 205 8.93 47 11.44
2003 141 6.14 35 8.52
Totals 2295 100.00 411 100.00
Table 1: Frequencies of IAS Adopters 
Panel C: Adoption Year Analysis
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for IAS Adoptor (ADOPT) and Non-Adopting Firms (NADOPT)
Variablea Mean Median
Standard 




∆ NI 0.0024 0.0023 0.0591 -0.0137 0.0211 -0.0002 0.0017 0.0568 -0.0130 0.0177
∆ CF 0.0065 0.0069 0.0729 -0.0269 0.0437 0.0022 * 0.0038 * 0.0695 -0.0282 0.0387
ACC -0.0453 -0.0413 0.0614 -0.0812 -0.0060 -0.0417 * -0.0376 * 0.0580 -0.0749 -0.0047
CF 0.0727 0.0720 0.0702 0.0243 0.1157 0.0692 0.0667 0.0661 0.0208 0.1115
SPOS 0.1434 0.0000 0.3505 0.0000 0.0000 0.1752 * 0.0000 * 0.3802 0.0000 0.0000
LNEG 0.0327 0.0000 0.1778 0.0000 0.0000 0.0222 * 0.0000 * 0.1474 0.0000 0.0000
RETURN 0.0146 0.0000 0.4082 -0.2379 0.2714 0.0177 0.0185 0.3818 -0.2140 0.2471
EPS/P 0.0749 0.0606 0.1562 0.0166 0.1239 0.0848 * 0.0624 0.1626 0.0149 0.1441
PRICE 1.1456 1.0096 0.5810 0.7707 1.3399 1.1312 1.0135 0.5459 0.7913 1.3205
BVEPS 0.2855 0.1376 0.3863 0.0582 0.3059 0.3082 0.1379 0.4186 0.0655 0.3480
NIPS 0.0516 0.0489 0.1196 0.0125 0.0889 0.0518 0.0485 0.1150 0.0124 0.0943
Control Variables:
LEV 3.2684 1.4665 4.9997 0.7957 2.8393 3.6889 * 1.5515 5.4827 0.7364 3.0777
GROWTH 0.1746 0.0683 0.5053 -0.0479 0.2269 0.1425 * 0.0587 * 0.4695 -0.0611 0.2091
EISSUE 0.1681 0.0753 0.4984 -0.0537 0.2419 0.1401 0.0543 * 0.4777 -0.0664 0.2151
DISSUE 0.2333 0.0592 0.6644 -0.0771 0.2519 0.1814 * 0.0533 0.5897 -0.0832 0.2391
TURN 0.7922 0.7419 0.5265 0.3621 1.1214 0.7837 0.7105 0.5463 0.3314 1.1256
SIZE 11.9986 12.0983 1.7551 10.7657 13.2880 11.5264 * 11.5886 * 1.7279 10.4162 12.6287
CF 0.0727 0.0720 0.0702 0.0243 0.1157 0.0692 0.0667 0.0661 0.0208 0.1115
* Significantly different between ADOPT and NADOPT firms at the 0.05 levels respectively (two-tailed).
ADOPT (Number of firm-years = 2295) NADOPT (Number of firm-years = 2295)
a We define ∆ NI  as the change in annual earnings, where earnings is scaled by end-of-year total assets; ∆ CF   as the change in annual net cash flow, where cash flow is scaled by end-of-year total assets; 
ACC  as earnings less cash flow from operating activities, scaled by end-of-year total assets; CF  as annual net cash flow from operating activities, scaled by end-of-year total assets; SPOS  as an indicator set 
to 1 for observations for which annual earnings scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01; LNEG  as an indicator set to 1 for observations for which annual earnings scaled by total assets is less than -0.20, 
RETURN  as the annual return from nine month prior to and three month after the fiscal year end; PRICE  as price as of six months after the fiscal year-end; EPS/P  as earnings per share scaled by price per 
share at the beginning of the year; LEV  as end-of-year total liabilities divided by end-of-year total equity, GROWTH  as percentage change in sales; EISSUE  as percentage change in common stock; 
DISSUE  as the percentage change in total liabilities during the period; TURN  as sales divided by end-of-year total assets; SIZE  as the natural log of market value of equity in millions
as of the end of the year;  BVPS  as book value of shareholders’ equity per share; NIPS  as net income per share.
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Table 3: Accounting Quality Analysis of IAS Adoption and Matched Non-Adoption Firms
ADOPT NADOPT
(N=1535) (N=1535)
Variability of ∆NI 0.0040 0.0033 *
Variability of ∆NI  over ∆CF 0.7287 0.6957
Correlation of ACC  and CF -0.5169 -0.5600
Small Positive NI (SPOS ) -0.0668 #
Large Negative NI (LNEG ) 0.1913 #
Regression Adjusted R 2 
Price 0.1356 0.1033 *
Return Regression:
  Pooling Good News and Bad News Observations 0.1049 0.0830 *
  Good News 0.0308 0.0030 *
  Bad News 0.0972 0.0941
*Significantly different between ADOPT and NADOPT firms at the 0.05 level (one-sided).
# Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (one-sided).
SPOS  is defined as the coefficient on SPOS  in equation (1):
LNEG  is defined as the coefficient on LNEG  in equation (2):
ADOPT(0,1)  is an indicator variable that equals 1 for ADOPT firms and 0 otherwise.  
Price regression is equation (3): 
Return regression is equation (4):
See table 2 for all remaining variable definitions.
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Variability of ∆NI 0.0025 0.0031
Variability of ∆NI  over ∆CF 0.5030 0.6212
Correlation of ACC  and CF -0.5395 -0.5708
Small Positive NI (SPOS ) -0.0023
Large Negative NI (LNEG ) 0.1768
Regression Adjusted R 2 
Price 0.2801 0.2343 *
Return Regresion
  Pooling Good News and Bad News Observations 0.0766 0.0796
  Good News 0.0306 0.0217
  Bad News 0.0700 0.0618
*Significantly different between ADOPT and NADOPT firms at the 0.05 level (one-sided).
# Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (one-sided).
SPOS  is defined as the coefficient on SPOS  in equation (1):
LNEG  is defined as the coefficient on LNEG  in equation (2):
ADOPT(0,1)  is an indicator variable that equals 1 for ADOPT firms and 0 otherwise.  
Price regression is equation (3): 
Return regression is equation (4):
See table 2 for all remaining variable definitions.
Table 4: Accounting Quality Analysis of IAS Adoption and Matched Non-Adoption Firms
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Variability of ∆NI 0.0025 0.0040 *
Variability of ∆NI  over ∆CF 0.5030 0.7287
Correlation of ACC  and CF -0.5395 -0.5169
Small Positive NI (SPOS ) -0.0822 #
Large Negative NI (LNEG ) 0.1677 #
Regression Adjusted R 2 
Price 0.2801 0.1356 *
Return Regression:
  Pooling Good News and Bad News Observations 0.0766 0.1049 *
  Good News 0.0306 0.0308 *
  Bad News 0.0700 0.0972
*Significantly different between Pre- and Post-Adoption samples at the 0.05 level (one-sided).
# Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (one-sided).
SPOS  is defined as the coefficient on SPOS  in equation (1):
LNEG  is defined as the coefficient on LNEG  in equation (2):
POST(0,1)  is an indicator variable that equals 1 (0)  for post- (pre-) adoption firm-years.  
Price regression is equation (3): 
Return regression is equation (4):
See table 2 for all remaining variable definitions.
Pre- and Post-Adoption Comparison 





















itititit NIPSBVEPSPRICE εβββ +++= 210
ititit RETURNPNI εββ ++= 10/
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Table 6: Cost of Capital Analysis of IAS Adoption and Matched Non-Adoption Firms
Expected Cost-of-Capital, ECC
Panel A: Pre-adoption N (firms) Mean STD
ADOPT firms 131 0.1148 0.0527
NADOPT firms 129 0.1142 0.0535
Difference 0.0006
Panel B: Post-adoption N (firms) Mean STD
ADOPT 336 0.0567 0.1179
NADOPT 348 0.0644 0.0871
Difference -0.0077
Panel C: ADOPT firms N (firms) Mean STD
Post-adoption 336 0.0567 0.1179
Pre-adoption 131 0.1148 0.0527
Difference -0.0580 *
Panel D: NADOPT firms N (firms) Mean STD
Post-adoption 348 0.0644 0.0871
Pre-adoption 129 0.1142 0.0535
Difference -0.0498 *
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